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This paper examines what scale of savings would result if
generic substitution, proposed under Section 22F of the
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of
1997,1 were to be introduced in South Africa. It also examines
whether the savings should be treated as such when weighted
against any possible negative consequences generic
substitution may have.
Generic substitution and its savings
A generic product is one that has exactly the same active
ingredient(s) as the existing branded (original) product.
Generic substitution is the replacement by a pharmacist of a
drug or medicine prescribed by a doctor with an alternative
drug or medicine of the same active chemical composition. It is
very different from the use of generic drugs or from the
prescription of such drugs by a doctor (generic prescribing),
since it empowers a person not actively involved in diagnosis
and treatment to change the treatment from one product to
another. To determine the level of savings from generic
substitution the present study used the same data sources and
a methodology similar to the one employed in a study by Scott
and Reekie in 1987. 2 The data for the study consisted of the 200
drugs with the greatest sales value for the year 2001 as
recorded by the pharmaceutical industry’s primary data
collector, Intercontinental Medical Statistics, and referred to
ethical (prescription-based) products sold in the private sector.
These drugs covered 53% by sales value of the ethical drug
market in South Africa. The generic products among these
drugs were identified by comparing all drugs listed in the 2001
year-end copy of the Monthly Index of Medical Specialities
(MIMS ) with one another in order to determine the drugs with
the same active ingredients. Savings were determined by
applying the percentage difference in price between the
cheapest generic and its branded counterpart (for the same
strength, pack size, and dosage) to that product’s sales value as
detailed in the database of the top 200 drugs. Mathematically
this is equivalent to calculating the total savings (S) as the
summed (S) difference in expenditure (at ex-factory prices)
between the highest (Ph) and lowest (P 1) price of the generically
substitutable product (i) as applied to its total quantity (Qt)
traded assumed to be made up of the pack size for which the
extremity in price difference holds.
Simply put:
N
S = S (Phi - P1i). Qti
i = 1
The data used did not include sales of ethical products by
provincial (state) hospitals and clinics. However, since these
organisations have practised generic prescribing for many
years it was considered that the practice of generic substitution
would not produce savings in this area. A number of the
ethical drugs incorporated in this study can be sold over the
counter (OTC), that is without a prescription from a doctor.
Since generic substitution relates to the substitution of a
product prescribed by a doctor with another product, those
drugs already sold OTC will not be substituted. Because of this
factor, the savings calculated here from the total submission of
all drugs with generic equivalents would exaggerate the
savings that would be attained in practice. There would also be
another reason for this, namely that not all pharmacists would
wish to change a doctor’s prescription, nor would all patients
be agreeable to changes.
With total substitution of sales of all lower-price (cheapest)
drugs in all possible instances — involving in total 46 products
— the total savings for the 200 top-selling ethical drugs were
found to be 6.1% of their total sales value. This percentage
saving is made up of 4.14% of the total sales value (Table I)
from the first 100 products and 1.96% from the second 100
products. As indicated by Scott and Reekie 2 and Reekie and
Allen3 this is expected in view of generic manufacturers
‘cherry-picking’ best sellers. Given the rapid reduction in the
proportion of generic product savings as sales values decrease,
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Table I. Potential savings broken down by product rank categories
First 100 largest sales value products (Rands) 214 512 471
Second 100 largest sales value products (Rands) 101 696 748
Total savings for the 200 products (Rands) 316 209 219
Savings as % of total sales for top 200 products 6.1
Total number of products that produced above
savings (N) 46
Calculated from raw data. Estimates are at ex-factory prices.
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it is reasonable to assume that the level of savings from generic
substitution will be even lower in percentage terms for the
remaining 47% of the market not investigated. Areasonable
estimate of the maximum savings to be expected from generic
substitution throughout the whole market can therefore also be
obtained (conservatively) by using the value of 1.96% for the
remainder of the market. This again exaggerates the potential
savings for the reasons outlined above. Application of this
value to the remaining 47% of the ethical drug market yields a
savings value of R91 498 758, giving an overall savings
estimate of R407 707 977 (R316 209 219 + R91 498 758). This
amounts to 4.1% of the total ethical drug market in South
Africa, and is even smaller at 0.5% of total (household plus
government) health care expenditure in the country in 2001.4,5
The findings here correspond to those of the Scott and
Reekie study, which investigated the savings from generic
substitution that would apply in South Africa were it to be
implemented in the mid-1980s. The study estimated the overall
potential saving from generic substitution in 1984, with total
substitution of sales of all lower price (cheapest) drugs in all
possible instances, to amount to 6% of the total sales value of
the top 200 products at the time. This saving came to 3% of the
total ethical drug market (at ex-factory prices) in South Africa
and to 0.4% of total health expenditure at the time. The
consistency of the findings suggests that the savings from
generic substitution are neither here nor there. This is further
underscored from an inspection, provided in Table II, of the
various cost components making up private sector health care
costs, as recorded by the Registrar of Medical Schemes, which
records data on approximately 85% of all persons covered.
Over the period 1993 - 2000 the costs of certain health care
components have been on a downward trend, such as
medicines, GPs, and dentists, while other costs have been on
an upward trend, such as hospitalisation and specialists, with
the costs relating to health care provision being far outpaced by
those from the administrative function of the medical
schemes/insurers.
Some final remarks
In 2001 the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise
Affairs at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development8 noted that multinational research-intensive
firms, which account for the bulk of the South African
pharmaceutical market, rely on at most three products to cover
their full research and development costs. Formal research
from Grabowski and Vernon9 and Grabowski et al.10 supports
this. Evidence from Scott and Reekie 11 and De Villiers and
Scott12 indicates that the case in South Africa does not differ.
Generic drug manufacturers do not create innovative products
nor do they incur the marketing costs of new product
introductions. Generic products come cheaper because they do
not embody the costs of innovation, which in real terms have
increased, on average, from US$138 million in the 1970s to
US$802 million during the 1990s. 13 Therefore, the thrust
towards generic substitution, aside from its nugatory savings,
also carries the possibility of reducing the levels of drug
innovation, as its mandatory nature (by statutory implication)
could stifle corporate incentives for funding future research
and development. By extension this could increase the risk of
closure of the business operations of those firms engaged in
research and development in South Africa.
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Table II. Real health care costs (index 1993 = 100)
Components 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Medicines 100.0 89.6 95.3 100.6 79.3 91.4 98.1 94.6
Hospitalisation 100.0 106.9 119.4 123.3 140.7 141.7 157.5 157.0
GPs 100.0 97.6 106.0 110.7 113.8 106.1 109.3 93.6
Specialists 100.0 104.6 114.1 126.1 120.7 123.1 134.3 131.7
Dentists 100.0 95.3 97.6 89.7 83.6 77.1 78.4 64.8
Administration 100.0 103.2 119.9 146.5 132.4 165.5 202.3 242.0
Sources: 6,7
Actual values deflated by the medical and health expenses CPI (1993 = 100).
